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Introduction 
expatriate military adviser in Bosnia in-
pired me to write this paper when he ex-
lained his opinion that demining accidents 
were "a statistical certainty. " I had just arrived in 
Bosnia after visiting Pakistan where I had conducted 
extensive interviews with deminers and their advis-
ers to learn how they had managed to reduce 
demining accidents. I realized that some of the tech-
niques that the Afghan deminers had devised for 
themselves were widely applicable. 
Two days before, I attended a meeting of 
demining managers in Bosnia, at which Mine Action 
Center Director Mr. Filipovic demanded that all 
demining procedures be followed rigorously. His re-
mark was prompted by a run of fatal accidents in-
volving the feared PROM-1 fragmemation mine in 
which deminers were not following the Standing 
Operating Procedures (SOP). His words barely faded 
when yet another accident occurred for the same rea-
son. 
By 1997, demining operations in Afghanistan 
had acquired a reputation for fatalism and risk rak-
ing. With 50 to 60 accidents each year among 2,000 
deminers, the Mine Action Program of Afganistan 
(MAPA) was seen by many in the industry as inn·in-
sically dangerous and, perhaps, our of control. Bill 
van Ree, the program manager at the time, explained 
later that Afghan deminers would ask him after a run 
of accidents, "Mr. Bill, what are you going to do 
about these accidents?" Yet by 1995, he realized that 
the accident rate could only be reduced once the 
deminers accepted partial responsibility for accidents. 
It is easy to accept the stereotypical view of the 
Afghan deminer as a fatalist: "If it is the will of Allah 
• 10 • 
An Afihan soldier watches a mine explosion in a mine field south 
of Kabul. 
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that today I will have an accident, then today I will 
have an accident." However, Bill van Ree realized that 
stereotypes can be incorrect and started a complete 
overhaul of attitudes in the demining program. His 
successor, Ian Bullpitt, continued this extraordinar-
ily successful effort. In 1998, accidents were reduced 
by 50 percent from 1997. In the first half of 1999, 
there were only 10 demining accidents in the entire 
program. The trend was continuing in 1999, until 
the third quarter when there was a significant increase 
in the accident rate--prompting further review of the 
program. ln spire of this increase, the Afghanistan 
demining program has achieved an enviable safety 
improvement that could provide a useful example for 
other demining programs. 
A comparison of accident rates between Af-
ghanistan and Cambodia, which have similar manual 
demining programs, shows that the accident rare in 
Afghanistan, before 1997, was much greater than 
that for Cambodia. However, close analysis reveals 
that most of the accidents in Afghanistan occurred 
while deminers were prodding and investigating 
PMN-1 mines. These mines are intrinsically more 
dangerous than the common PMN-2 mine in Cam-
bodia. Furthermore, the ground conditions in Af-
ghanistan are more likely to lead to prodding acci-
dents: extensive vegetation roots grow around bur-
ied mines in Cambodia, thus reinforcing the soil. 
This environment means that it is easier to detonate 
a PMN-1 mine by accident in Afghanistan than a 
PMN-2 mine in Cambodia. This hypothesis remains 
to be formally tested, but it could explain most of 
the difference in accident rates between the two pro-
grams before 1997. 
Also, the construction indusuy in Pakistan ac-
cepts an accident rate of three percent. Only serious 
accidents, those requiring hospital stays or death, are 
included in this number. Based on this percentage, 
with 2,000 deminers, one could expect 60 accidents 
per year. While this accident rare would be entirely 
unacceptable in a Western country, it serves as a use-
ful comparison. 
Western Industrial Practice 
Industrial practices in the West have led to im-
mense improvements in safety in many industries, 
including aviation, the chemical industry, the nuclear 
industry, construction, mining and offshore oil and 
gas production. All of these industries have devised 
strategies ro minimize accidents. Many lessons have 
been learned from rhem. 
One of the main lessons is that there is an in-
trinsic link between safety and quality. T he practices 
leading ro high quality work most often lead to safe 
working conditions. The methods of quality improve-
ment pioneered by Deming and applied so success-
fully by Japanese companies can also lead ro signifi-
cant safety improvements. "Kaizen," the practice of 
continuous improvement by small changes, has been 
widely applied in all these industries. 
Another widely applied practice is the disrribu-
tion of responsibility within reams. Authoritarian 
models of organizations proved to be inappropriate 
for achieving high qual ity and high safety. Industries 
learned that high quality results could only be 
achieved through high quality work practices. This 
goal could not be achieved through rules , regulations 
and close supervision withom the active cooperation 
of the workforce. By placing more responsibility in 
the hands of individuals, even to the extent that they 
could choose their tools and equipment, companies 
found improved quality, safety and productivity. 
Many of these techniques are well documented 
in industrial literature. They are part of the normal 
curriculum for industrial engineering students in 
most Western universities. What surprised me most 
about this research was the discovery that many of 
these techniques had been reinvented by Afghan 
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AnATCteam. 
Photo c/o ATC dem ining organizations in response co their safety 
and quality problems. 
Initial Investigations 
By 1997, MAPA collected a large database on 
demining accidents. Each accident is investigated by 
an independent monicoring agency, and a detailed 
report is submitted co the mine action program man-
ager. This 30 co 40 page report includes a summary 
report by the investigators; interviews with the 
deminer involved; interviews with the supervisor and 
team leader; report of an inspection of the accident 
site with phocographs; medical reports from the hos-
pital receiving injured personnel; post-recovery re-
portS on injured personnel; details of injuries with 
photographs of injured personnel immediately after 
the accident; and recommendations for procedural 
changes or protective equipment. 
One of the first steps coward reducing accidents 
was a statistical analysis to discover common factors 
in the majority of accidents. As a result, it was pos-
sible co describe the "typical dem ining accident." 
Such typical accidents could occur at 8:30 a.m. in 
summer while a deminer was prodding a PMN-1 
mine or when the deminer was working in a diffi-
cult area, such as an irrigation channel, a steep slope, 
in thick vegetation or in ruined houses. Some fac-
cors were fa lse leads. While one might have suspected 
chat deminers would become fatigued in the heat of 
summer, most accidents occurred before the hottest 
part of the day. 
We became involved on rhe periphery of this 
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effort, as we worked co devise cost-effective protec-
tive equipment for deminers (Trevelyan 1999). We 
focused on p rodding accidents and produced proto-
types of improved head and face protection visors and 
helmets, prodders with safety guards co protect hands 
and an apron co protect the body. We focused on the 
reasons why most deminers worked in the squatting 
position, contrary co SOPs that require that deminers 
lie on the ground while investigating targets. We de-
vised effective protection co enable them co work in 
the squatting position. We concluded that the squat-
ring posit ion is far more comfortable and probably 
more effective from an ergonomic standpoint. We also 
discovered that deminers are reluctant to lie on the 
ground because it is so difficult to keep their uniforms 
looking clean. Deminers are widely regarded in Af-
ghanistan as a high status group; they believe that 
wearing dirty cloth es detracts from their status. How-
ever, the main priority for mine action program man-
agement was avoiding accidents. 
Demining Organizations in Afghanistan 
The United Nations Office for Coordinat-
ing Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan 
(UNOCHA) operates the mine action center at its 
head office in Islamabad, Pakistan. The program 
manager, deputy manager, logistics officer and a tech-
nical adviser (expatriate staff) are based in the office 
with an operations manager and Afghan support staff 
The main UNOCHA office provides communica-
tions. The other expatriates include a technical adviser 
based with META in Jalalabad and a regional man-
ager based in Kabul. About 4,000 other Afghan staff 
members work for a number of independent NGOs 
that implement the mine action program in Afghani-
stan. 
The Monitoring, Evaluation and Training Agen-
cy (META), based in Jalalabad, provides training 
courses for the entire program. As the name suggests, 
META is an independent agency responsible for ac-
cident investigations, monitoring demining quality 
standards, quality control checks and several ocher 
tasks under the general direction of the program man-
ager. Their role in quality control is currently under-
going major restructuring. 
The Mine Clearance and Planning Agency 
(MCPA), with its head office co-located with MAPA 
in Islamabad, carries out Level l and Level 2 su rveys 
and maintains maps and databases for the entire pro-
gram. 
Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC), a 
UNOCHA partner, is the oldest and largest demining 
NGO in Afghan istan. Present direccor Kefayarullah 
Eblagh established the organization in Occober 1989. 
ATC started demining operations in early 1990, with 
an initial staff of35. Since then, it has undergone sig-
nificant change and expansion. ATC has developed 
in co a highly organized and effective NGO employ-
ing about 1,300 personnel. The head office is in 
Peshawar, Pakistan. 
The Mine Dog Center (MDC) was formed early 
in rhe program to train and operate the mine detec-
tion dog program, which was also started in 1990. 
O riginally based in Pakistan, MDC has now moved 
roKabul. 
Two other Afghan NGOs carry our demining 
operations: the Demining Agency for Afghanistan 
(DAFA) in Kandahar and the Organization for Mine 
C learance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR) in 
Heart (Maley 1998). HALO Trust is the only foreign 
dem ining NGO and operates in Kabul and the 
northern areas where fighting continues. 
Mine clearance operations rely primarily on 
manual demining and use dogs on suitable tasks and 
mechanical support (backhoes) in residential areas 
and mined irrigation channels. For more details, re-
fe r co Trevelyan (2000). 
Organizational Changes 
Work procedures 
Kefayarullah Eblagh, director of ATC, explained 
to me that his first step coward reducing accidents 
was co accept responsibility. ATC is a paramilitary 
organization modeled in a uniquely Afghan style. The 
director is nor only an authoritarian figure but also a 
caring parent co his entire workforce. He has to as-
sume responsibility for the families of injured or 
killed deminers. Deminers rake their personal prob-
lems to the director at any rime--it is a demanding 
job for any person. ATC has undergone many 
changes in the effort co reduce accidents and improve 
quality and safety. 
ATC deminers work in reams of 30 men. Each 
ream has 12 breaching parties of two men each. In 
demining's early stages, each breaching parry con-
sisted of three men. The first man would be respon-
sible for using the metal detector; the second man 
would investigate with a prodder; and the third man 
would monitor his colleague's actions. 
Jn the three-man drill, and initially with the two-
man drill, deminers were trained in one area. Later, 
the two-man drill was changed co where each 
deminer operated the metal detector and investigated 
the targets he located. This method reduced the 
chance of incorrectly marked target locations- the 
suspected cause of several incidents. It should be 
noted that Afghan deminers use painted rocks co 
mark mine field boundaries and suspected target lo-
cations. Lane boundaries are marked with steel rods 
and rope. On the other hand, Cambodian deminers 
always operate on a 0.5m x I m strip at the end of 
the lane marked by wooden poles. Though the Cam-
bodian practice takes slightly more time, it is prob-
ably safer than the Afghan methods. 
T he two-man drill was initially introduced to 
improve efficiency and productivity. The first man 
used the metal detector and investigated targets with 
a prodder while the second man monicored. After 20 
co 30 minutes, they would exchange roles. All per-
sonnel would take a rest break after a two-hour pe-
riod. 
Four section leaders monitor the actions of the 
breaching parties and record their work. A ream leader 
monitors the entire team, coordinates transport and 
handles communications, record keepi ng and other 
administrative functions. Each ream also has a driver 
and a paramedic on standby. 
One of the first changes made to improve safety 
was to change the two-man drill. ATC suspected that 
the deminers needed more rest, so they decided to 
rest a new arrangement in which one man would 
work for 20 minutes with a metal detector and 
prodder while his partner rested some distance away. 
The responsibili ty for supervision was placed with the 
section leader. With the deminers resting every 20 
minutes and the section leaders sharing each other's 
supervision, the rest breaks every two hours were 
eliminated. The result was a reduced risk of dehydra-
tion in the summer heat and greater working effi-
ciency. 
Sleep 
Lack of sleep was also a suspected cause of fa-
tigue among deminers. The Afghan deminers wake 
as early as 3:30a.m. in the summer for dawn prayers, 
yet they retire at 9:30 p.m. While there was an op-
portunity to rest between prayers and breakfast, ATC 
decided that more rest was required. The daily sched-
ule was accordingly rearranged. The original summer 
time schedule is shown in Table l. Times are approxi-
mate-prayer times depend on sunrise and sunset and 
other activities are scheduled around prayer rimes. 
Safety Awareness 
Accident investigation reports typically empha-
sized a failure to follow SOPs as the main contribut-
ing cause. While deminers often did not follow rhe 
correct procedures, this disregard was usually due to 
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First Summer Schedule Table 1 
't:OO a.m. Wake , prepare for pra~ers 
't:30 a.m. Breakfast 
5":30 
a.m. 
Mornins parade, pra~er for 
safet~, address b~ site 
manaser 
6:00 a.m. Depart for work site 
(about one half hou r 
transi-t) 
6:30 a.m. Commenc e work 
8:30 a.m. I•' Break 
11:00 a.m. 2...J Break 
1:30 p .m. Finish work in mine fi eld, 
pra~ers, return to 
c.amp 2.:00 p.m. Lunch 
3:30 p.m. Afternoon pra~er , equip-
ment maintenance 
6:00 
p.m. 
Sunset pra~er 
6:30 p.m . Dinner 
7:30 p.m. Even ins pra~er 
9:30 p.m. Bed and lishh out 
10:30 p.m. Radio shut-down 
circumstances at the particular site rather than neg-
ligence. This fact does nor include the widespread 
practice of squatting during demining. Some other 
variations on the SOPs are widely practiced, such as 
reducing the number of marking stones when mark-
ing the location of a metal detector indication. Ac-
cording to deminers, when they are aware of the pres-
ence of site managers, staff of higher status or visi-
tors, they revert to SOPs. 
ATC recognized that if there was to be any varia-
tion in the standard procedures, the implications had 
to be examined first. Therefore, they decided to 
implement a dai ly meeting among the deminers to 
d iscuss safety and the need for special procedures at 
the particular site. The daily safety briefing was used 
to review and discuss safety hazards or technical prob-
lems or the si re. Deminers could voice their own 
opinions to their team leader and also report "near 
misses." 
Anorher move to increase rest breaks and reduce 
fatigue was to place restrictions on weekend leave for 
deminers. Deminers are normally based at camps 
close to rhe work site. Three teams and a resident sire 
manager are normally based together at the same 
camp called a "project site." ATC decided that 
deminers would not be allowed to travel home on 
the weekend. 
Other problems prior to this decision included 
the following: 
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Revised summer schedule to improve 
sleep pattern Table 2 
't:OO a.m. Wak e , prepare f or pra~ers 
't:30 a.m. Breakfast 
5":30 a.m. Mornins parade , pra~er for 
6:00 a.m. 
6:30 a.m. 
12.:30 p.m. 
1:00 p.m. 
1:30 p.m. 
2.:00 p.m. 
't:OO 
p.m. 't:IS' p.m. 
6:00 p .m. 
6:30 p .m. 
7:30 p.m. 
9:30 p .m. 
10:30 
p.m. 
safet~, address b~ site 
manaser 
Depart 
f or 
work site 
Cappro'IC. half hour transi-t ) 
Commence work 
Finish work at mine field, 
on-sit
e 
safet~ review. 
Return to c.amp, pra~ers 
Lunch 
Compulsor~ sleep 
Afternoon pra~er 
Trainins session, review of 
operations , dail~ adivit~ 
reports , equipment mainte-
nance. 
Sunset pra~er 
Dinner 
Evenins pra~er 
Bed and lishts out 
Radio shut-down 
Transport d ifficulties, such as traffic accidems 
and traveling rimes, caused deminers to return 
to camp late on Sunday night; 
· A loss of sleep due to social activities with fam-
ily over the weekend; 
Security problems, such as dem iners who were 
arrested and detained by authorities for tres-
passing; and 
While at home, the deminers unintemionally 
informed their friends and fam ilies of incorrect 
information which then was reported to the 
Taliban authorities, causing problems for the 
mine clearance agencies. 
leave schedule 
Deminers have 30 days of paid annual leave. 
Eight days are set aside for the Eid holiday, leaving 
22 other days. Each team is given eight days paid leave 
after two months. ATC allows rwo days fo r traveling 
to reach family homes and two days to return. Many 
deminers take four extra days from their annual leave 
to increase these breaks to 12 days. 
Responsibility in Supervision 
ATC also recognized that when deminers failed 
to follow agreed procedures, supervisors had to share 
the respons ibility. Section leaders often have a prob-
lem when a deminer persistently refuses to follow their 
directions. It is not uncommon for the section leader 
simply to give up and let the deminer take responsi-
bility for his own safety. 
To reduce the chance of this occurrence, ATC 
decided to demote and decrease the pay of section 
and ream leaders one level immediately after an ac-
cident, which could only be restored following an in-
vestigation clearing them of wrongdoing. To imple-
ment this procedure, ATC required prompt feedback 
on the causes of an accident. META required several 
weeks and even months to complete irs accident re-
port. Thus, ATC had to have its own investigation 
capability. ATC staff is delegated for accident inves-
tigation whenever the need arises. Typically, the site 
manager and rwo section leaders from other teams 
are assigned to an investigation. 
Changing the culture 
Just as experience in Western industri es has 
shown, it is necessary to change the cult ure of an au-
thoritarian organization to obtain significant safety 
and quality improvements. Respons ibility has to be 
delegated and shared appropriately at different lev-
els in the organization. Deminers need a level of d is-
cretion in deciding how to approach each task. It is 
not possible to devise foolproof procedures for every 
conceivable mine field situation . 
Afghan culture rends to resent centralized au-
thority; so, it is remarkable that organizations as large 
as ATC can operate with such high levels of reliabil-
ity. This activity is more remarkable when one real-
izes that the demining organizations are practically 
the only sign of a large-scale, disciplined organiza-
tion in the entire country. T hey operate in a vacuum 
surrounded by chaos, d isintegration, extreme poverty 
and deprivation. The social institutions we take for 
granted in Western countries simply do not exist in 
Afghanistan. T here is usually no electric power, po-
lice force, coherently organized system of justice, so-
cial security, post office nor any telephones. 
Sharing responsibil ity could be regarded as fool-
hardy in these circumstances. Yet the experiences of 
ATC show that it is possible and has led to signifi-
cant safety improvements. T he other demining or-
ganizations adopted many of the changes pioneered 
by ATC. 
The Views of Deminers 
As part of research on the technological needs 
of deminers, we interviewed several deminers and 
staff in different organizations. Some of their opin-
ions and quotes make interesting and informative 
reading. 
An operations manager based in Peshawar said, 
"The only time I experience a bad day in my job is 
when I receive a report of an accident in a mine field . 
That is a very depressing experience. Fortuna rely, we 
are making big improvements. In the firs t six months 
of 1997, we had 17 accidents. In the same period of 
1988, we had seven accidents. T his year [1999], we 
have had only one accident in the same period. I am 
still concerned about July-it is the hottest month 
of the year and a bad rime for accidents." 
One deminer said, "One of the teams at our site 
had two accidents last month. One of the deminers 
had several arguments with his partner. His original 
partner had fallen sick and had gone home for sev-
eral weeks leave. The new partner did not get on with 
him well ar all. T hen there was an accident. I do not 
know what rhe cause was, bur I am sure that if they 
had nor been arguing the accident would not have 
happened. In my ream, if a deminer is upset or an-
gry, he is nor allowed to work that day. Even though 
it is harder ro keep up with the schedule, we feel safer 
that way. Also, deminers are less likely to be angry or 
upset if they know that all the rest of the team has to 
make up for their work." 
Another deminer said, "One of our problems is 
that we are always being asked to work faster. We have 
heard that teams which work too slowly may nor get 
any work contracts. It is difficult when you work in 
a m ine field with many fragments and you can only 
work slowly in this kind of mine field. " 
A third deminer remarked, "The safety meetings 
are a good idea. We discuss mistakes to make sure the 
work is done correctly. Peopl e forget the correct pro-
cedures, and when the problem is discussed, we re-
member our training. Sometimes, I mention mistakes 
I have made myself. Often, l only tell them to my 
friends in my rent, and I give thanks to God that I 
am safe, and I try and tell them not to do it again. 
Sometimes I also tell the team leader but not always. 
The ream leader says, 'please be careful and don't do 
that again.' " 
Training 
The Afghanistan demining program has a highly 
organized system of training deminers and provides 
them with refresher courses every six months. META 
runs separate training courses for supervisors , team 
leaders, UXO special ists and communications. ATC 
also runs many internal training courses for its staff. 
English classes are provided both for administration 
and demining personnel. Nearly all of the adminis-
tration staff is computer trained. Many other special-
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ized training courses have been run, using both in-
ternal and external instructors. The level of training 
has reached the point where a significant number of 
ATC staff are being recruited by international 
demining agencies for work in other countries. ATC 
deminers, supervisors and administration staff are 
now working in Iraq, Somalia and elsewhere. 
Comparison with Western Practice 
We can see several significant parallels between 
the changes introduced to ATC to improve safety and 
what would be regarded as "best practice" in west-
ern industries. ATC devotes significant resources co 
improving its workforce. Apart fro m support for 
deminers' families and help with personal crises, the 
organ ization provides significant training and career 
development opporcunities for its staff. 
Responsibility is delegated across the organiza-
tion, rather than being concentrated at the top. Team 
leaders, supervisors and deminers all contribute to 
discussions on safety and the techniques that should 
be used to deal with particular mine field problems. 
Team leaders and supervisors carry significant respon-
sibility and pay the penalty if an accident occurs in 
their team. 
Safety and cautiousness are reinforced daily at 
the safety briefings. Deminers are not allowed to for-
get the need to constantly be careful to avoid acci-
dents. The organization pays careful attention to the 
health and well being of deminers. While recogniz-
ing the importance of home leave, discipline is im-
posed co ensure that deminers are in top physical 
condition for the required job. In contrast to the ste-
reotypical fatalist image of an Afghan deminer, all 
employees accept that accidents have human causes 
and can be prevented. An accident represents orga-
nizational failure as much as human failure. 
Further Improvements 
There are generally three classes of accidents in 
demining. One class occurs while a mine is being in-
vestigated or destroyed. Another class occurs because 
deminers walk on a mine that has been overlooked. 
The third class occurs when deminers walk in areas 
chat have not yet been cleared. 
Understanding these classes leads to the close 
link between safety and quality in demining, as in 
any other industry. If a deminer steps on an over-
looked mine, he is the victim of poor quality work 
by other deminers or possibly his own poor work. Ic 
is this link that is currently being targeted in MAPA 
in a major overhaul of quality assurance procedures . 
• 16. 
Currently, deminers check their work in an in-
formal manner. As one deminer walks forward to re-
sume work at the end of a lane, he sweeps his detec-
tor from side-to-side to check for overlooked metal 
targets. From our observations of deminers working 
in a simulated mine field in Islamabad, Pakistan, this 
checking is not very thorough, but it does reveal 
missed targets. After completing che clearance of a 
significant area, deminers may check the area once 
again with a metal detector. 
In a carefully documented test, we observed an 
instance of a serious error which could lead ro acci-
dents. When one deminer has finished working at the 
end of a lane, he usually marks the last position cleared 
with a painted stone or by leaving his detector lying 
across the lane at the end of the safe area. We observed 
how one deminer located a metal target forward of 
his position and on the left-hand side of the lane. After 
he had located the metal fragment, he marked the 
target location with a stone. His partner thought that 
the stone marked the end of the safe area. As the dia-
gram shows, it did not-it marked the location of the 
last target removed. The area to th e right of the stone 
had not been cleared, but the second deminer missed 
this area, which happened to contain two targets that 
could have been easily discovered with a metal detec-
tor. The targets were missed again when they carried 
out a final check of the area. 
In an effort to overcome errors such as these ex-
amples, Afghan demining NGOs are working on a 
system of comprehensive quality checking. It has been 
proposed that each deminer thoroughly check the 
ground cleared by his partner in the most recent spell. 
The partner will commence checking at the point at 
which he last worked and work forward until he 
reaches the end of the area his partner cleared. Each 
section leader will also conduct a comprehensive 
check of the area cleared by the deminers working 
under him. Finally, the team leader will check 25 per-
cent of the area cleared by the ream. This procedure 
will add significant costs to clearance operations. It 
is clearly impractical for a supervisor to check ground 
adjacent to where deminers are currently working. 
Further, the supervisor cannot do the checking while 
he is expected co supervise deminers at the same time. 
Approximate calculations suggest that the extra work 
involved will add perhaps I 0 percent to the cost of 
clearance. However, this reflects a significant empha-
sis on safety and quality and will reduce the amount 
of reworking required. Another important issue is the 
quality of work the initial deminer performs. 
The comprehensive checking procedure de-
scribed above may nor improve the qualiry of the ini-
tial demining wi thout significant incentives. If 
deminers know that the area they have cleared is go-
ing to be checked again, they may think that it is okay 
co leave a target unchecked every now and again. On 
the other hand, especially if there is some degree of 
embarrassment or penalty associated with the discov-
ery of a target missed by a deminer, working stan-
dards could improve. 
Finally, it is necessary to remember that this pro-
posal has been stimulated by a significant rise in the 
accident rate after a long period of decline. It is pos-
sible that this increase reflects a common industrial 
problem. Major changes to work practices chat im-
prove safety have a limited lifetime. After a while, 
workers develop a false sense of security and stop pay-
ing as much attention ro their work practices. It is 
necessary to introduce further changes to avoid this 
risk. Constant vigilance is necessary to maintain stan-
dards, and experience in Western industries suggests 
chat constant change is also required. 
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